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INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE OAS 
AND THE DOMINICAN CRISIS 
Charles G. Fenwick 
The year is 1904. We had a president 
then with some fight in him-Theodore 
Roosevelt. He looked around the Carib-
bean, saw disorder, and said, "This has 
to stop." At that time we didn't have 
any ideas of international cooperation. 
He just took up a big stick and, ouch! 
thc Dominican Republic was hit on the 
head. He said to Venezuela, "What did 
you borrow all that money for and 
bring European powers over here? 
Didn't you know any better? They lend 
money and expect you to pay it back 
and' will come for it if you don't." He 
chastized Venezuela, the Dominican Re-
public, Nicaragua-in the name of an 
international police power; there wasn't 
much of an international element in it. 
It was Theodore Roosevelt with a big 
stick, maintaining law and order-not 
maintaining it in the interest of a world 
of law or order, no, not immediately, 
but rather maintaining it in the interest 
of the United States. 
Now the year is 1907. We are having 
a peace conference at The Hague-the 
second Hague Peace Conference. What 
in the world was the matter with the 
delegates from the United States, not to 
mention those from Great Britain and 
other countries? They went to a con-
ference which was called a peace con-
ference and signed 13 conventions, 11 
of which related to the conduct of the 
next war. 
As a young law clerk at the Carnegie 
Endowment nearly 60 years ago I was 
assigned to edit a book by our chief 
delegate to the Conference. Nobody had 
a constructive idea of stopping another 
war; the whole thing was how to fight it 
humanely, as if you can blow up a man 
humanely. Dum-dum bullets were for-
bidden. An ordinary Spanish bullet in 
1898 went right through you, and you 
still could keep going, but a dum-dum 
bullet would tear your arm open, and 
that was forbidden. In other words, you 
could blow a man to pieces and it was 
all right, but you must not cause hiin 
unnecessary suffering while he is still 
alive and maybe can go back to fight 
again. 
The year 1914 came and war was 
smoldering in Europe. I was then in 
Germany, and I heard the Kaiser say 
from the palace that war had come and 
all should go forth to die in defense of 
the country. That same night, in France, 
the French Foreign Minister was saying 
the same thing. And what did Woodrow 
Wilson do? He said there ,vas nothing 
we could do. It was too bad, but we 
were not in a position to uphold inter-
national law and order. We had the 
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans as barriers 
to protect us. We were neutral, and as 
neutrals we didn't know the difference 
between right and wrong. But we didn't 
just sit there; we began to lend money; 
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we began to sell arms and ammunition 
and made profits out of the war until 
the time came when we were practically 
in the war ourselves. Woodrow Wilson 
then had an idea. We can't go on with 
this business of neutrality and get in a 
war in spite of our desire to stay out of 
it. Let's aholish neutrality and start a 
system of collective responsibility of all 
countries for the maintenance of peace. 
In 1920 came the League of Nations 
-an attack upon one is an attack upon 
all. That's the principle of the State of 
Rhode Island-an attack upon one is 
technically and theoretically an attack 
upon all. But when Woodrow Wilson 
came back from Paris with a treaty to 
that effect and presented it to the 
Senate, they said, "Oh no, what is this 
man doing? Dragging us into a world of 
wars; wasn't one war enough?" One 
objection after another was raised: "Are 
we going to involve the United States in 
a system of world law and order, with 
the possibility of another war?" 
Gentlemen, in the Constitution of 
the United States, article 4, section 4 (I 
am giving the reference to you so that it 
won't embarrass you, because few seem 
to know the article or the section), it is 
said that the United States guarantees to 
each state in the United States a republi-
can form of government. It says that, 
but please remember that in that day 
"republican" meant "democratic." The 
United States guarantees to each state a 
democratic form of government and will 
protect each of them against invasion. 
That Constitution came down to the 
state of Virginia for ratification. 
When I was a hoy I was put up on a 
table and had to recite Patrick Henry's 
"Give me liberty, or give me death." 
When Patrick Henry saw that clause in 
the Constitution he said to the Virginia 
Legislature, "Call off the ratification of 
the Constitution; Virginia will never 
send her hoys to die in the marshes of 
Rhode Island to protect that state 
against Massachusetts. " You have some-
thing in your own early history that 
suggests that Massachusetts had not 
behaved very courteously toward Rhode 
Island. Of course, Patrick Henry didn't 
know Newport then. If he had, he 
certainly would have let Virginian boys 
save Newport. Well, in 1920 that was 
the attitude that Senators Johnson of 
California, Lodge of Massachusetts, 
Borah of Idaho, and others, took 
toward Woodrow Wilson's proposal of a 
system of collective responsibility-an 
attack upon one is an attack upon all. 
But we were not interested then in 
world law and order. We were only 
interested in our own safety-our na-
tional security, which obviously comes 
first, but we did not see that our own 
security was involved in a world of law 
and order. I lectured allover the United 
States in those days. I lost every debate. 
I was trying to persuade the American 
people that the only hope of staying out 
of another war was to prevent it. Profes-
sor Borchard of Yale called me an 
evangelist, and a senator called me hy an 
uglier name-he said I was in the pay of 
Great Britain, and all that sort of stuff. 
The year 1927 came and the Repub-
licans-(forgive me if some in the 
audience are offended hy my attitude, 
but down in Virginia I was brought up 
to think that all Repuhlicans were bad, 
some worse than others, but all were 
bad) well, what were the Repuhlicans 
going to do? They had to do something, 
so they proposed to take a New Year's 
resolution, and we adopted the Kellogg-
Briand Pact outlawing war. Instead of a 
League of Nations that might provoke 
war, let's outlaw war; let's adopt a 
resolution declaring war unlawful. 
Once upon a time there was a man 
named John Brown, let's call him. He 
was a hard drinker. January 1st came 
and his wife, Maria, thought he should 
do something-should take a resolution. 
So John Brown did take a resolution. 
He said, "Maria, I solemnly swear that 
for the coming year I will not touch a 
drop unless I am exceptionally thirsty." 
Now the Kellogg-Briand Pact said, 
"We won't go to war; we will outlaw all 
wars except wars of self-defense." Look 
over your American history and see if 
you can find one war that was not a war 
of self-defense. In other words, it was 
fraud of the first order; hut somehow or 
other we were taken in hy it, outlawing 
war. Japan wasn't trouhled; she went 
right ahead against China. Stimson was a 
grand man, hut all he could do was to 
say, "The United States will not recog-
nize any conquest." That's all. That 
didn't trouhle Japan. She didn't care 
whether we recognized her conquest or 
not She would have it just the same. 
In 1936 a war in Europe was on the 
horizon, and we thought we ought to do 
something to protect America. So we 
met down in Buenos Aires, and I had 
the honor of heing a delegate of the 
United States to that conference. Frank-
lin Roosevelt went down, and we met, 
and we said to the Latin Americans, 
"You don't like the hig stick, do you?" 
They said, "No; we don't like the hig 
stick." We said, "All right, we'll throw 
the hig stick into the river if you will all 
collectively agree that in the event of an 
attack from Europe you will all support 
the United States on the principle of the 
Monroe Doctrine." The Foreign Minis-
ter of Argentina was opposed; he did 
not like the underlying danger of what 
he called "Monroeism." But with the 
aid of our friends, notahly the Brazilian 
Aranha, a magnificent speaker, we 
succeeded, although it was the weakest 
treaty in all of our history. In the event 
of a threat to the peace we would 
consult individually: to decide whether 
to consult collectively, to decide 
whether to do anything. That was the 
treaty of 1936. But it was a heginning, 
an opening wedge. We call it consulta-
tion-a consultative treaty-and that was 
the cornerstone of our inter-American 
system: consultation in the event of a 
threat to the peace. 
Two years later we met at Lima, 
Peru; it was the same thing over. We 
tried to get something stronger hecause 
11 
the clouds of war were on the horizon 
in Europe, and with a war on the 
horizon we wanted to strengthen the 
inter-American system so that we could 
stand together as neutrals. Stand to-
gether as neutrals? What had we done in 
1935, 1936, and 1937, hut practically 
give the green light to the dictator 
Hitler? We said that in time of war (we 
didn't say it to Hitler, of course, we said 
it to our own people) you mustn't get 
involved. If you are a hanker, don't you 
lend 10 cents to a helligerent. If you are 
a munitions maker, don't you sell one 
gun. That was exactly what Hitler 
wanted hecause the British are never 
ready. They could not helieve that a war 
was coming. I was over in England in 
1939. I had gone all the way to Stock-
holm, Sweden, to make a peace talk, as 
if Sweden could have any influence over 
Hitler. I came hack to London and went 
to Parliament with a friend on 2 August. 
All this, and the 4th was the start of 
World War 1. What was Parliament 
doing? They were discussing an old-age 
pension hill. Can you helieve it? I said 
to my friend, "What in the world do 
they mean hy losing their time in this 
crisis? Don't they know that August 4th 
is an anniversary, and Hitler is the kind 
of man to hegin his war on the date that 
would have a psychological reaction in 
Germany?" But you couldn't keep 
Britons from their weekend. Saturday 
came and Parliament adjourned, too 
honorable to helieve that others could 
he dishonorahle. A month later the war 
was on, and when it came we soon 
found that the attitude of neutrality 
that we had taken was completely 
against our own hest interests. The 
Germans didn't trouhle this time ahout 
violating merely the neutrality of Bel-
gium; that was nothing. They invaded 
Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and Nor-
way, and the United States suddenly 
woke up as if with an electric shock. If 
this man is going to take over all of 
Europe, Britain will go under of a 
certainty, and where would we he? How 
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much value would the Atlantic Ocean 
be to us? So we woke up and met with 
Churchill on the high seas and decided 
that neutrality was past. We undid the 
neutrality laws, and we prepared to help 
Britain, principally through the trade of 
naval bases and destroyers. Then, 
finally, the Japanese hit us, and we were 
in the war. 
It was a war we could have prevented 
20 years before had we seen the light. 
We were now in it, and with it we 
completely changed our policy and saw 
that the United States had a vital 
interest in the maintenance of interna-
tional law and order, a fundamental 
national interest. Then we formulated 
the Charter of the United Nations, 
which was simply a repetition of the 
principles of the old League of Nations 
that an attack upon one is an attack 
upon all, except that we gave a veto 
power to a select few who constituted 
membership of the Security Council. I 
was in Latin America at that time, and 
they said, "We are very doubtful about 
this new League of Nations. If you are 
going to give Russia a veto we are not 
for it." How was it possible that we 
were ready to give a veto to the "Big 
Brown Bear',? Oh, the "Big Brown 
Bear" had affectionate arms in those 
days. We trusted Stalin. We couldn't 
take in how fundamentally untruthful 
he was. So we gave the Soviet Union a 
right of veto. Latin America met in 
Mexico City and said, "The only condi-
tion on which we will go into this 
proposed United Nations is if you allow 
us the reservation of self-defense in case 
of a veto by the Soviet Union." So we 
gave them article 51 of the Charter. You 
have a copy of the Charter; read article 
51. It reserves the right of self-defense, 
individual or collective, until such time 
as the Security Council has kept the 
peace, so that if Russia vetoes measures 
to keep the peace, you have the right of 
individual or collective self-defense. 
With that principle recognized the 
United States said to Latin America, 
"Let's meet, modify, and strengthen our 
Own regional collective security system 
in the light of the Charter of the United 
Nations, taking advantage of the right of 
individual or collective self-defense." So 
we met in Rio de Janeiro and formu-
lated the Treaty of Reciprocal Assis-
tance. That is the cornerstone of inter-
American collective security-the Treaty 
of Reciprocal Assistance of 2 September 
1947. 
That treaty has two elements to it: it 
says that in the event of an armed 
attack against anyone of the American 
states within the hemisphere or without, 
we are all obligated to come immedi-
ately to the defense of the state 
attacked. The second part says that in 
event of a threat to the peace through 
an act of aggression short of an armed 
attack we are all obligated to consult 
together to decide what measures must 
be taken to meet the threat to the 
peace. That is the cornerstone today of 
inter-American collective security. 
A year later we met at Bogota in 
Colombia (a lovely spot, a little bit 
high) and we signed the Charter of the 
Organization of American States. The 
Charter, in this respect-collective se-
curity-merely repeats the terms of the 
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 
1947, the Rio Treaty. That again, I 
repeat, is the cornerstone of our collec-
tive security system. 
Now let us see how it works. In 1951 
a conference meets in Washington, an 
inter-American conference. What is it all 
about? Well, unhappily, since 1945 the 
whole collective system of the United 
Nations has gone to pieces. The whole 
collective system, that an attack upon 
one is an attack upon all, has broken up. 
Why? Because some clever chemist or 
physicist, or whatever he was, has in-
vented an atomic bomb; and one single 
country, the Soviet Union, with an 
atomic bomb in its pocket can defy the 
whole world. Who is going to risk 
challenging it? Collective security means 
that the whole community, acting 
collectively, is strong enough to prevent 
an attack, to warn a nation against 
committing an act of aggression; but if 
one single country has an atomic bomb 
in its pocket and is evil-minded enough 
to use it, who is going to challenge that 
country? Who is going to dare risk 
complete annihilation? There were Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki; were they not 
examples of what could happen with 
that bomb? How far would you expect 
any country to ehallenge the big states 
that had the atomie bomb? And so for 
the moment the Soviet Union was, in a 
sense, supreme. We had the atomic 
bomb; we had used it first, but the 
Soviets could trust us because anyone 
who knows our history, our long tradi-
tion, knows that we do not break our 
word; but anyone who knows the more 
recent tradition of Russia knows that 
they do break their word and will break 
their word and in 1947 and 1948 were 
breaking it all over eastern Europe. That 
was the situation. We met in Washington 
in 1951 and extended the idea of a 
threat to the peace to include an act of 
aggression by the Soviet Union-not 
very specific and definite. Not, of 
course, an open attack, but the subver-
sive activities of the Soviet Union. That 
was the first act of the OAS to meet a 
threat to the peace under the Rio 
Treaty. 
Let's look at another phase. The year 
1954 comes and the Russian infiltration 
in Latin America has gone forward. We 
meet down in Venezuela, and at Caracas 
we take a resolution in which we said 
that the control by international com-
munism of the government of any 
American state will be regarded as a 
grave threat to the peace, and we would 
meet in common consultation to take 
action together to confront it. Inter-
Ameriean colleetive seeurity, in the faee 
of a threat to the peace, was specifically 
directed to international communism. 
Other applications of the Rio Treaty 
may be mentioned. In 1961 a dictator 
in the Dominican Republic, Trujillo, 
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actually went so far as to conspire with 
Communists in Venezuela to assassinate 
the President of Venezuela, something 
unheard of in our history. Betancourt 
was a liberal president of Venezuela 
trying to protect that country from 
Communist infiltration, and Trujillo 
sought to help assassinate him. Fortu-
nately, the bomb exploded just after 
Betancourt's car had passed the desig-
nated spot. But there was no question 
whatsoever of Trujillo's responsibility, 
and so we met and put sanctions against 
Trujillo. They were mild sanctions at 
first, but they could be followed by 
stronger ones, such as a sanction against 
the shipment of oil, which will bring 
any government to a stop today. That's 
just a sample of how the OAS acts. 
Then there was a boundary dispute 
between Honduras and Nicaragua. 
Nicaragua contested the boundary that 
had been fixed in the year 1906 by the 
King of Spain. "Oh," says the Nica-
raguan delegate, "the King of Spain 
didn't even read the documents. We 
don't have to accept ~ award of 50 
years ago." So a war was coming close. 
We called them both to Washington, sat 
them down around the table at the 
Pan-American Union, and we said to 
them in strong terms, "Shame on your-
selves, you signed the Rio Treaty, and 
the Charter of the OAS calls for the 
submission of this problem to a settle-
ment by arbitration." I offered to settle 
it as Head of the Department of Law. I 
offered to settle it for 30 cents. I was 
paid by the Pan-American Union, so I 
said I would settle it for them. But 
critics said, ''What, a worm like you, a 
little small 2-by-4 lawyer?" If you ever 
have a real case and want to prevent 
your home parliament from criticizing 
you too sharply, you submit the case to 
the International Court of Justice, and 
instead of 30 cents you pay ten thou-
sand times that much for French 
lawyers and other clever ones. You lose 
your case before the Court and go back 
to your home parliament, and it can 
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make no criticism. What a grand amhas-
sador we have in 'Washington; the 
Nicaraguan Amhassador, like the gentle-
men he is, accepted the decision of the 
International Court of Justice, and a 
quarrel of half a century came to an 
end. 
In 1959 a revolutionary government 
takes over in Cuha, and Castro, seeing 
that he can't possihly win hy normal 
procedures, tears up the Rio Treaty-
tears up the Charter of the OAS-and 
proceeds to come to terms with whom? 
With our friends in Russia. "Put missile 
hases here and you will he right under 
the nose of Washington, and you can get 
anything you want from them." The 
Russians accepted his invitation to come 
over and huild missile hases. We in-
spected (the Navy and the Air Force are 
to he credited here) and found that the 
missile hases were under construction. 
The Russian Amhassador had misled 
President Kennedy, pretending, ''We are 
not doing anything in Cuha except to 
assist them in defending their country." 
But the missile hases were not a mere 
hasis of defense hut were a hasis of a 
possible Russian attack. President Ken-
nedy intervened on 22 Octoher and said 
to Khrushchev, "Destroy your missile 
hases or else." For ahout three days we 
were a hit nervous. I certainly was. But 
Khrushchev took the warning and 
destroyed the missile hases, although we 
did not succeed in getting the right to 
send in inspectors. We are today, in 
self-defense, engaged in photographic 
reconnaissance over Cuha to he sure 
that no new missile hases are heing 
huilt. 
The most serious prohlem of the 
atomic homh is that you don't know 
who attacked you. In the good old days 
you knew who hit you, and you hit 
hack. We knew who struck us at Pearl 
Harhor, and we hit hack at him and his 
friends. But if an atomic homh were to 
hlow up Washington or New York 
tonight, we wouldn't know who hit us. 
And so President Kennedy said to 
Khrushchev, "If an atomic attack comes 
from Cuha we shall regard it as coming 
from Russia." Now that meant some-
thing. For three days I confess I was 
nervous. No douht you were too. 
Khrushchev gave way and the hases 
were hroken up. We haven't found yet a 
solution to the Cuhan situation. I don't 
know why we didn't invade Cuha the 
day that Castro tore up the Rio Treaty 
and the Charter of the OAS. I would 
have. Mayhe you think I am wrong, that 
is your privilege. And one of the argu-
ments in the Dominican Repuhlic case, 
which we now turn to, was that one 
Cuha was enough. We can't risk having 
the Dominican Repuhlic turn into an-
other Cuha. 
In April 1965 we found in that 
unhappy country that the infiltration of 
Communist agents was creating unrest 
hordering on civil war. When our amhas-
sador reported that there was shooting 
in the streets and people couldn't leave 
their hotels to huy food without the 
risk of heing shot hy some Tom, Dick, 
or Harry who happened to have a gun, 
we sent our troops in to protect them. I 
consider that the initial act of pro-
tecting our citizens in Santo Domingo, 
capital of the Dominica.!! Repuhlic, was 
an ordinary act of self-defense without 
any reference to the Rio Treaty or the 
Charter. The next day we called in 
consultation the Council of the Organi-
zation of American States, and at first 
the reaction was hesitant. But then as 
things got worse, and it was clear that a 
civil war would hreak out, the OAS 
created an armed peace force, the first 
time in American history-an inter-
American armed force. While that 
armed force was largely from the United 
States, it had with it the hacking in 
principle of Latin America, and we very 
wisely arranged to have a Brazilian 
general put in command. 
Brazil is a magnificent country. I 
spent years there representing the 
United States during the war. Brazilian 
generals are the finest type of men you 
could meet anywhere, and the present 
Brazilian Foreign Minister, Juracy 
Magalhaes, who was Ambassador in 
Washington, couldn't be more typical-a 
man whose integrity is absolute, whose 
word is his bond, and who is our friend. 
I say that also for the present Ambassa-
dor in Washington, Vasco Leitao da 
Cunha. He is a gentleman and a man of 
character and intelligence. We appointed 
a Brazilian general to give an interna-
tional character to the peace force. But 
the forces in the Dominican Republic 
wcre largely American forces, as in my 
judgment they should be. 
Now, a lot of myoid friends and 
friendly enemies say, "You have no 
right to go into the Dominican Repub-
lic; that's intervention. That is a viola-
tion of the fundamental principle of 
nonin tervention." Intervention has 
created a psychological, I would say 
almost a psychopathic, reaction in some 
parts of Latin America from memories 
of the days of the big stick. We are not 
intervening in the Dominican Republic 
any more than the Rio Treaty justifies 
us. 
Was there a threat to the peace in the 
Dominican Republic? Obviously there 
are threats to the peace of different 
degrees. I think there was a serious 
threat to the peace, and President John-
son expressed it very clearly when he 
said, "One Cuba is enough." If the 
Communists infiltrate and take over the 
Government of the Dominican Re-
public, we shall have a problem on our 
hands like that of Cuba and a possible 
danger from an atomic bomb getting 
into the hands of some fanatics who 
would throw it, and we won't know 
where it came from. So I am not 
troubled about the accusation of inter-
vention. 
In the law of the State of Rhode 
Island, as in the law of every other state, 
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we respect the home life of the citizen. 
We respect the family life of the citizen, 
but when disorder breaks out in the 
family, if husband beats wife and wife 
screams, we don't say, "Oh, no, you 
can't go in that house, a man's home is 
his castle." We go in, and we stop the 
violence. In my judgment the world is 
growing today to the point where what 
would not have been a threat to the 
peace 50 years ago and would not have 
troubled us can be today a threat to the 
peace. We have grown together; we are 
working new agencies. The Alliance for 
Progress that we started five years ago is 
unable to function where there is riot 
and disorder. In the past riot and 
disorder have as a rule not been con-
sidered sufficiently important to consti-
tute a threat justifying intervention. But 
I would say today that if a revolution 
should break out in one country or 
another the Organization of American 
States would be justified in doing what 
it could to prevent a civil war. The days 
of civil war are over. You cannot have a 
civil war today without disturbing the 
peace, certainly not in America. Conse-
quently I interpret the Rio Treaty, 
article 6, where it speaks of a threat to 
the peace, in a broader sense than it 
would have been interpreted 50 years 
ago. The United States has a vital 
national interest today in the main-
tenance of international law and order. 
That's the fundamental principle on 
which we stand. That principle was not 
even heard about in 1914; it was re-
jected by the United States in 1920. But 
today, in the changing world in which 
we are living, I maintain that we have a 
vital national interest in the main-
tenance of international law and order. 
On that basis I defend the intervention, 
if you want to use the word, of the 
United States in the Dominican Re-
public. 
----lJi----
